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Power Imbalances in Favela-Upgrading 
Practices in São Paulo, Brazil
GUILHERME ROCHA FORMICKI
Abstract 
Favelas in São Paulo, Brazil have been undergoing major transformations since the 1980s with 
the rise of upgrading programs. These programs are widely seen as ways of alleviating urban 
vulnerability. However, the fact that they change the political structure of favelas, causing power 
imbalances, goes often untold. This article discusses the outcomes of upgrading efforts in Favela 
do Sapé, placing a special emphasis on the social actors involved in the upgrading. Characters 
such as favela dwellers, governments, and parallel powers are assessed through a power 
planning lens. The present analysis also focuses on the social actors’ relational possibilities 
that are aimed at changing the power scenarios of favelas.
Keywords: Favelas, Favela-Upgrading, Power Planning, Social Actors
1. Introducing the Dynamics of Favela do Sapé
On a dry and sunny afternoon Favela do Sapé, in Western São Paulo, suddenly became 
a ghost town. The frequent rush of children who used to play by the creek shores, as 
well as routine commuters who would walk down the narrow alleys to the closest bus 
stop, abruptly ceased. Even during upgrading works, the residents of this favela would 
not give up on their routine. But on that day, something different was happening. 
By that time, I was an intern at the São Paulo City Housing Department (SEHAB) 
and my constant visits to Sapé had taught me how daily life would usually take place 
in the community. In the described afternoon, one architect from SEHAB and I were 
conducting inspection visits to residences which had been affected by cracks and other 
consequences of the ongoing work of tractors and trucks. When walking alongside the 
creek’s shore, we noticed that everyone instantly vanished from sight.
As we curiously stared at each other, the explanation soon made its way through 
the opposite shore. A group of heavily armed policemen came out of nowhere and 
marched up the main street of Sapé. Fearing a shooting, we quickly left the waterfront 
area and looked for shelter in the City Hall’s upgrading headquarters—which hap-
pened to be a makeshift structure originally designed to be the core of the construction 
site. A few moments afterward, we received news that the police raid was aimed at 
arresting a suspect for stealing a car in the surroundings of Favela do Sapé.  
Favelas are defined by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, in 
its Portuguese acronym) as agglomerations of at least 51 residences, set in an irregular 
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grid, which lack basic services such as water, electricity, sewage, and garbage pickup. 
Also, favelas are set on a piece of land that residents do not own (IBGE 2011). UN 
Habitat uses the term “slum” to define a type of housing that (1) lacks basic services, 
(2) is substandard or presents illegal or inadequate building structures, (3) is highly 
dense or overcrowded, (4) offers unhealthy living conditions or is placed at a hazardous 
location, (5) presents tenure insecurity and (6) is amid poverty and social exclusion (UN 
Habitat 2003, 14). In this paper, the term “favela” will be employed instead of “slum” for 
it is here understood that each country has its particularities when it comes to precari-
ous and vulnerable housing. And, since a Brazilian case will be assessed in this article, 
it is fair to label it with its proper local name.
The police raid narrated above is not exclusive to Favela do Sapé. In São Paulo and 
in other Brazilian cities, residents of favelas often witness police incursions, which are 
usually aimed at tackling organized crime that operates in and outside these settlements’ 
boundaries. In the specific case of Sapé, it cannot be said that police presence necessar-
ily relates to upgrading works. Nor should it be claimed that what I witnessed on that 
day in 2015 started to happen more frequently after this favela had its works completed. 
Nevertheless, this episode sheds light on a common phenomenon that takes place 
in favelas across São Paulo and Brazil as a whole: The dispute over territorial control 
between different social actors and groups. On that specific day, I could identify the 
police as one of those groups. But news daily delivered by the city’s media outlets, as 
well as studies carried out by scholars and authorities, also convey the existence of 
other groups. Maybe because of the impact of the means deployed by criminal organi-
zations—namely, violence and fear—organized crime is the most evident social actor. 
But other groups may also be involved in the contest for spatial control in vulnera-
ble settlements in São Paulo, especially in areas undergoing upgrading. These groups 
include the city’s government—which is not always tied to the police—residents, 
upgrading designers, urban planners, social workers, etc.
This work is written based on the idea that upgrading interventions are an 
attempt to change the political structure of favelas, but result in power imbalances. 
The point is that before the beginning of the works favelas are usually a territory com-
manded by the parallel power, which manages to establish a relatively pacific avenue of 
interaction with these settlements’ dwellers. However, the municipal government may 
seek to regain control over favelas through upgrading, which implies the physical and 
institutional rearrangement of those communities.
When it comes to the parallel power, there are many ways of labeling it. Gabriel 
Feltran (2011), for instance, calls it the “criminal world.” Janice Perlman (2010) usually 
uses the term “drug gangs.” In short, the parallel power is understood in this paper as 
the organizations commanded by criminals who are usually involved in drug-dealing. 
These organizations—such as Primeiro Comando da Capital, or First Command of the 
Capital—oftentimes act as institutions that are parallel to the government and that 
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establish their own order in their territories, usually through violence and fear. Due 
to reasons such as government neglect, one of these territories in Brazil is the favela.  
The state-sponsored process of reclaiming favelas is assisted by planning, archi-
tectural, and engineering firms. These three groups usually represent technical exper-
tise, around which power might also gravitate in vulnerable settlements. Planners, 
architects, and engineers hold design as their tool to perform changes to the built 
environment. Favela residents are also a key group involved in the quest for power, as 
they are the direct target of social policies, police incursions, and actions carried out 
by the parallel power.
A natural perturbation is always felt when favelas undergo upgrading works. After 
all, during these works outsiders such as architects, planners, engineers, and social 
workers hired by the local government flock into these communities. Also, upgrading 
plans are a major cause for chaos since they entail one view of how these communities 
should be shaped in the future, regardless of some of the implications this new confor-
mation can have on local actors.
The concept of power imbalance originates from Bent Flyvbjerg’s work, which in 
general terms is based on the power planning concept. To be more precise, Flyvbjerg 
addresses this framework as “phronetic planning.” For the purposes of this article, the 
same approach has been relabeled power planning.
Flyvbjerg (2002) studies the influence of power relations within planning prac-
tices. He claims that, based on their interests, the most powerful social actors control 
the way planning-related data will be interpreted and how planning practices will be 
prioritized and carried out in their cities or communities. He analyzes the implemen-
tation of a car-traffic reduction project in the city of Aalborg, Denmark. This planning 
project partially relied on the assessment of surveys of local shoppers’ transportation 
modes. Flyvbjerg asserts, “The interpretation [of survey results], which has the stron-
ger power base, becomes Aalborg’s truth, understood as the actually realized physical, 
economic, ecological, and social reality” (360).  
Similarly, the interpretation of the needs for favela-upgrading works in Sapé, as 
well as the project priorities ascribed to this upgrading and the way they were con-
ducted were legitimized by the most powerful group of social actors in this context. 
The São Paulo City local government, as well as planning professionals—architects, 
urban designers, engineers, and social workers—had the biggest say on how the Sapé 
upgrading was carried out. And this community’s residents, who had less power, were 
to some extent maneuvered (as shall be explained in item 5). The parallel power was 
naturally left out of the decision process. 
Bent Flyvbjerg probably did not conceive of his methods with favelas in mind, 
but if some theoretical constraints are rightfully accounted, his framing can be rep-
licated and applied to the power dynamics that emanate from favela-upgrading proj-
ects. Therefore, this paper will turn an eye toward Brazilian communities, especially 
through—but not limited to—Flyvberg’s perspective. 
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This work follows a predominantly qualitative approach, which is founded on 
the analysis of Favela do Sapé as a case study. The primarily-collected material for 
this analysis includes a total of six semi-structured interviews carried out with local 
dwellers, public officials from the São Paulo City Housing Department, and from a 
company hired by SEHAB to oversee upgrading works. One of the six semi-structured 
interviews was also conducted with a member of the design team of Sapé’s upgrading. 
All these talks took place throughout 2016 in Favela do Sapé and other areas, such as 
the Housing Department headquarters. The names of interviewees are intentionally 
omitted for confidentiality. 
Primary sources also comprise pictures taken in situ during visits that occurred 
between 2014 and 2016, as well as satellite images adapted for this article. Secondary 
sources correspond to news articles taken from newspaper archives and from hard 
news websites. Academic literature, especially on urban violence, spatial segregation, 
and power dynamics, was also vital to the making of this paper. 
It should be mentioned that although this article heavily relies on interviews, 
one major constraint regards their conduction. Power dynamics are a naturally deli-
cate matter as they relate to subduing and subjugating processes wherein at least one 
social group is undermined. In Favela do Sapé’s context, the most influential element 
in local power relationships is physical and psychological violence. For this reason, 
asking local residents and other actors about specificities of the settlement’s power 
dynamics proved to be a difficult endeavor. This became a taboo issue that had to be 
overcome with a careful elaboration of less sensitive questions, as well as through the 
consultation of other sources such as academic literature.
This paper is structured into this introductory section, five other parts, and a con-
clusion. The next section will cover a brief literature review of favelas, urban peripher-
ies, and elements that often relate to these places such as the vast influence of the par-
allel power, landownership issues, and the autoconstruction practices witnessed there. 
The following section will explain in detail the upgrading project of Favela do 
Sapé, including envisioned and actual interventions. The fourth section of this work 
will go further in the description of Sapé’s upgrading. In this part, a contextualization 
of upgrading policies and practices will be given through the lens of the dispute for 
territorial control between the local government and its allies on one side and the par-
allel power on the other. The fifth section will cover a very specific and unique practice 
that rises from upgrading programs in São Paulo: the Management Council. It will be 
argued that in Sapé this council was an important participatory planning tool. But, on 
the other hand, it can be seen as a mechanism for the government to maneuver favela 
dwellers into siding with the City Hall in the local quest for power.
The last section preceding the conclusion will focus on the power planning theory 
and other ideas that explain Sapé’s upgrading. The final link between all interviews, 
field observations, and consulted literature will be made in this section. By including 
these sections and organizing them in this way, this paper will ultimately shed light 
28Berkeley Planning Journal 30
onto the idea that planning is heavily conditioned by the outcomes of power struggles 
between various social actors. 
2. Favelas and the Periferia: Where Ownership Issues, 
Violence, and Organized Crime Meet
Favelas have historically been disputed territories in Brazil between state forces and 
criminal organizations, as well as between different drug gangs. In some cases, para-
military forces, or militias, also take part in claiming favela land. As Janice Perlman 
(2010) puts it, “Favelas are appealing locations for drug gangs,1 with their narrow, 
winding alleys, abundant hiding places, and unemployed youth” (165). The sale of sub-
stances such as cocaine from favela territories to high-income consumers is the mech-
anism that mostly sustains the parallel power. And the reaction from state forces even-
tually comes as a means of repression toward two distinct groups: criminals and favela 
residents (Leeds 1996, 50). The former may be the primary target of the police; however, 
the latter group usually ends up affected by repressive state action as well.2 When it 
comes to favela dwellers, Elizabeth Leeds points out that “squatter populations, in par-
ticular, are caught between the illegal violence of drug dealers and the official violence 
of security forces” (ibid.). 
Favelas are settlements that bear different geographical locations across Brazilian 
cities. Whilst in Rio de Janeiro many of them are scattered through high-income neigh-
borhoods, in what resembles socially vulnerable and physically precarious enclaves, in 
São Paulo most favelas emerge on the city’s fringes, usually labeled as periferia, or periph-
ery. As Mautner (1999) explains, the geographical periphery of São Paulo does not 
fully overlap with the periphery defined by urban sociology. She adopts the sociolog-
ical understanding—which this paper also does—and defines the periferia as a place 
where the poor live, as well as a socially segregated area with low real estate values.3 
Additionally, the periphery of São Paulo, and many other Brazilian cities as well, com-
prises areas that are distant from transportation infrastructure and most employment 
opportunities. These areas also lack social, leisure, and public facilities. 
1 It should be noted that this paper does not claim that favelas are susceptible to trafficking because of one 
sole feature, such as physical irregularity. The point made by Perlman and supported in this article is that a 
combination of issues (namely, lack of state presence in police patrolling and in the provision of infrastructure, 
basic services and facilities, as well as a lack of economic opportunity and of representativeness) coupled 
with the narrow alleys, dead ends, and physical and visual obstacles that exist in favelas create a convenient 
stage for opportunistic criminal groups to establish themselves in these settlements.
2 Cases of favela dwellers who are shot during confrontations between policemen and criminals are 
frequent. Other ways through which those dwellers can be affected by repression (such as in selective police 
searches) are more nuanced.
3 Mautner also defines the periphery as a transforming place, which is gobbled up by the formal city and 
which thus expands its borders centrifugally (Mautner 1999, 254).
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The periferia is thus marred by social exclusion in most cases. Ermínia Maricato 
(2010) describes the Brazilian peripheral city as an outcome of “peripheral capitalism,” 
which implies that low-income populations from cities in developing countries may 
settle in areas excluded from the formal land market, as well as from existing urban 
regulations (8). It is important to make a crucial distinction here. Although most fave-
las in São Paulo are on the city’s periphery, due to a few technical and abstract ele-
ments, they cannot be seen as synonyms.
As Holston (2008) explains, favelas usually emerge from squats in areas that can 
either be central or peripheral. The periferia is, on the other hand, mostly built on 
the ideas of land and home ownership, which materialize in loteamentos (subdivisions). 
Naturally, there are squatter areas in the periphery as well, but the dwellers of the 
urban fringes originally settled in these areas after paying for their land and for the 
construction of their residences. The author argues,
Even if the former [settlers who pay for land and for their home’s construction] were swin-
dled in their purchase and could not prove full legal ownership as a result, the majority 
could claim to have transformed themselves in the process of settling the peripheries from 
renters, squatters and mere posseiros [squatting landholders] of land into landowners. (185)
In fact, although periferia residents usually stick to the idea of ownership, in many 
cases, land occupation in the peripheries originates illegally. Holston explains that 
“[the] very illegality of house lots in the peripheries makes land accessible to those who 
cannot afford the higher sale or rental prices of legal residences” (206–207). 
It should be noted that even if they illegally occupy land, the poor working classes 
that inhabit São Paulo’s peripheries do not necessarily resort to property seizure. As stated 
in one quotation above, they might pay for their land’s occupation and development, but 
still end up in a form of “illegal or irregular residence” after being defrauded (ibid., 208).
And what about the abstract driver of the comparison between favelas and 
peripheries? Due to the fact that favela dwellers usually seize property, as opposed to 
purchasing it, favelas are usually seen by peripheral residents as places of “physical” 
and, consequently, “moral” disorder (ibid., 173). There is, thus, a conceptual separation 
between squatting (favelas) and ownership (subdivisions in the periferia) sustained by 
the inhabitants of the latter.
Holston also describes the historical bifurcation of the trajectory of the urban 
poor in São Paulo during the 1940s: Governmental measures and other influential 
forces prompted the urban working poor to leave their dwellings in the city center.4 As 
he puts it, “They could either try to remain in the more central areas, moving into the 
new favelas . . . or hanging onto rooms in cortiços [tenements] . . . or they could move to 
the distant hinterlands” (165). The hinterlands are the areas where the peri feria would 
4 Among governmental measures and other factors was the 1942 approval of the Renter’s Law, which froze 
rents in Brazil and thus made renting unfeasible from the landlord’s perspective. Coupled with that, were 
the numerous demolitions of rental units due to urban renewal efforts in central São Paulo. Lastly, the 
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later be constructed. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, favelas and 
the periphery are seen as mostly different alternatives.
One of the ultimate construction mechanisms in the periphery of São Paulo is 
what Caldeira (2016) calls “autoconstruction.” As she explains, autoconstruction—
known as well as “self-building”—is a process by which periferia dwellers incremen-
tally build their own houses, usually with their own labor (5). Ermínia Maricato (2010) 
adds that this process is also related to fragile land ownership, usually based on clan-
destine occupations of urban plots (9).
Ananya Roy (2005) explains that informal settlements within cities are a conve-
nient mode of urbanization for governments in the developing world. She points out 
that the state reserves to itself the power of legitimizing and delegitimizing informal-
ity. The state also has the means to curtail or foster informal urban settlements. For 
Roy, it is a matter of “political struggle” (150).
Feltran (2010) explains that the aforementioned periferia dwellers that built their 
houses through self-help in the Greater São Paulo area were, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
usually associated with the image of “trabalhadores,” or workers. These workers over-
came adverse conditions, such as low education attainment and income, by forging 
political movements. Many movements were related to national and regional unions 
or had local implications—including community organizations that fought for social 
goods (such as asphalt, piped water, housing provision, etc.) and for the actual achieve-
ment of universal rights (592).
Feltran argues that, after the 1980s, the “criminal world” gained room to com-
pete for legitimacy with traditional peripheral elements such as labor and political 
representativeness. From this point onward, crime began to influence local residents 
and their institutions (592). This was witnessed in the favelas that were located in São 
Paulo’s periferia. Similarly, favelas in central areas also went through similar processes 
of crime-control escalation.
After this brief explanation of the social and historical processes that encom-
passed the periphery of São Paulo and many of this city’s favelas, it becomes possible 
to understand the constitution of what would later result in power struggles and imbal-
ances between the parallel power, dwellers, and the government in this case. Now, the 
physical shaping of this case study shall be assessed.  
3. The Upgrading Plan for Favela do Sapé
Territorial interventions are crucial ways of interfering with power relationships. 
Favela-upgrading efforts could be seen in this sense as a means to change the way 
space is built, as well as who occupies it. Having said that, it should be noted that 
this article does not have the ambition to assert that the power struggles which were 
gradual replacement of streetcars for buses made settlements in the periphery a feasible alternative to living 
downtown (Holston 2008, 162–163).
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witnessed in Sapé necessarily happened in other upgraded favelas. This work aims to 
assess the particularities of the selected case study. Thus, hopefully this work can make 
room for similar studies in the future. 
In order to understand the upgrading plan of Sapé, it is important to trace back 
the process of settlement in this favela. It is located in Rio Pequeno District, an area 
that was formerly considered peripheral but has currently been incorporated by the 
formal city in many ways. 
The first settlers moved into Sapé in the 1970s. A testimony from a long-time 
local dweller conveys the neglect from the city government in relation to the constitu-
tion of a physically precarious housing network on the local creek’s waterfront:
Sapé had the river, the river that used to flow and that still flows today. But it was a very 
shallow river, very shallow. When I arrived here, there were no shacks in front of the river. 
There were shacks, but very few. Then, [the years] went by and [Sapé] went on growing, 
growing, growing. The waterfront started to expand. The waterfront started to expand and 
there was a point in which there was nowhere to build anything.
The conditions that followed those years of increasing occupation in Sapé led to 
housing insalubrity mainly due to flooding and landslide risks. It became evident that 
some kind of physical intervention was necessary, as another testimony narrates: “My 
house was on the waterfront. I lived [there for] 26 years. I experienced floods. I expe-
rienced floods that my stove, the water would cover it. I experienced floods [so] that I 
lost everything.”
Upgrading came, then, as the answer. This type of intervention should be under-
stood as a way of consolidating residential areas in favelas, with few demolitions. In 
upgrading projects, favela dwellers usually remain in their homes and have infrastruc-
tural facilities such as sewage systems and new road space implemented in their com-
munities. New housing units are built only to rehouse displaced families within the 
favela boundaries. The primary aim is to improve the targeted areas rather than to 
rehouse all dwellers. 
The devised project for Sapé aimed, among other objectives, at clearing the local 
creek’s floodplain, which meant demolishing 527 residences alongside the watercourse. 
Another important criterion for demolition was the physical precariousness of some 
dwellings. The City Hall estimated that, before the upgrading, 9% of homes (about 210 
units) were made of wood, which is considered more insalubrious a material than brick-
work, which is more commonly adopted in São Paulo’s favelas. Additionally, the project 
envisaged clearing 98 residences to make room for new road space. Lastly, 354 homes 
would be demolished to open space for the resettled units. The foreseen displacements 
accounted for 1,082 residences in total (Formicki 2016, 81-82).
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The upgrading process ended up clearing 1,496 houses and replaced them with 
462 housing units5 between 2012 and 2017. This means that more than 1,000 fami-
lies are still displaced.6 It shows that while on the one hand upgrading interventions 
can solve the physical precariousness of many families, on the other, such interven-
tions can also engender troublesome consequences. In other words, upgrading favelas 
could result in exclusion and displacements. In this sense, Sapé’s case illustrates what 
well-intended policies can lead to.  
Naturally, exclusion was not the original intent of the São Paulo City Housing 
Department and upgrading designers. Although the number of planned displacements 
in Favela do Sapé reached a high proportion—the total amount of families that orig-
inally lived in the community was 2,362—there was an original prediction that more 
housing units would be built not only in Sapé itself but also on two separate plots of 
land near the favela (ibid., 82). Problems with construction funding and land ownership 
ended up being a definitive hindrance to more replacements (80). 
It is important to state that, according to Zuquim (2012), although complete favela 
clearings can still be seen in São Paulo, recent city administrations have been imple-
menting upgrading programs in favelas with a certain regularity since the 1980s (6). 
Thus, Sapé is a result of the recent shift in the city’s housing policy. 
4. Favela-Upgrading as a way of Intervening in Space and the Status Quo
Sapé’s upgrading project designer: I think that design, architecture, and urbanism are 
always a transformative action of space. We always transform. When we transform we 
demand that users revisit their ways of behaving. Organized crime, as well as formal social 
institutions, are based on permanence. That means that it is easier to administer the public 
good or it is easier to administer the control of space by trafficking with the constancy of 
places. If that place starts being constantly changed, you have to revisit the rules, you have 
to revisit the strategies, your points of view, your strong and weak points in the territory’s 
domain. So, I think that the works in Sapé, which lasted four years, were a big disturbance 
for drug dealing, for the dealers, for the domain scheme that Sapé’s space had. 
As mentioned before in this paper, territorial interventions strongly interfere with 
power relationships. Studies and hypotheses that range from the defensible space theory 
to so-called authoritarian modernism have been devised—and critiqued—in order to 
5 This was Sapé’s situation by September 2017 when the upgrading works were already over. The upgrading 
works in Sapé were carried out between 2012, when the first displacements took place, and 2017, the year 
when the last housing units were delivered.
6 In such cases, the São Paulo City Housing Department (SEHAB, in its Portuguese acronym) pays a 
monthly allowance to displaced families until they are rehoused in public residential units. The problem 
that usually arises is that families receive a low allowance of 400 reais (equivalent to about 120 dollars), which 
only enables them to seek precarious housing.
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frame how planning and architecture’s takes on the built environment may influence 
people’s behaviors.
For instance, Oscar Newman’s defensible space theory attempts to explain how 
architectural and urban design might affect the way U.S. low-income condominium 
dwellers see themselves responsible for public, semi-public, semi-private, and private 
areas. Among other points, Newman (1996) argues that if a designer conceives of more 
private areas in a housing project, its dwellers may feel more inclined to take care of 
their own spaces, watch out for them, and, thus, help prevent “crime and instability” 
issues there (28).
It is important to counter-argue that the defensible space theory may not con-
sider a series of social and economic factors that can explain the incidence of crime in 
housing projects. In other words, Newman might have overlooked issues such as the 
social vulnerability of many dwellers, as well as the low governmental funding for the 
maintenance of spaces in public housing condos.
Other authors have also formulated theories and critiques of the way modern-
ism-based architecture, urban design, and planning have been shaping cities. Holston 
(1989), for instance, argues that the modernist ideas that guided the design of Brasília 
were nourished by the “utopian” premise that “the design and organization of Brasília 
were meant to transform Brazilian society” (21). James Scott (1998) uses the expression 
“high-modernist authoritarianism” to talk about how, in his view, Le Corbusier would 
see urbanism and the role of the planner (111).
When it comes to favela upgrading, planning and design may affect the way dif-
ferent social actors embrace the transforming built environment. The interview excerpt 
in the beginning of this section illustrates this point. In this case, the works themselves 
implied an at least temporary change in the routine and order of Sapé. And, as shall be 
explained in the following paragraphs, technical experts who were hired and supported 
by the São Paulo City local government attempted to implement a new, definitive spatial 
order that could affect this community’s parallel power in the long run.
In the previous quotation, historical neglect from the city’s authorities toward 
Sapé’s settlement was evidenced in the words of a local dweller. The social constitution 
of favelas, spatially embodied by squatters and precariously-built and insalubrious res-
idences, was layered upon an active inaction from the government. The decades-long 
omission by authorities created the conditions for other actors—namely, settlers—to 
take over territorial control.7
Following the population that migrated to Favela do Sapé, another set of actors 
stepped into the area to claim its territory. One of these actors is the parallel power, 
7 This state omission cannot, however, be simply interpreted as a state absence. As Caldeira (2016) points 
out, “peripheral urbanization does not mean an absence of the state or planning, but rather a process in 
which citizens and governments interact in complex ways” (7). The author says that local governments in the 
Global South usually allow for squatting in urban peripheries and, years later, intervene by improving these 
areas and providing squatter setters with land regularization and, in a few cases, social housing.
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which should be here understood as a group of actors that have some control over 
areas such as favelas similarly to governments but not officially. In São Paulo, the par-
allel power is embodied by a major drug-dealing organization called “PCC,” Primeiro 
Comando da Capital, or First Command of the Capital. It gained prominence in 
São Paulo and penetrated this and various other communities city- and state-wide. 
Biderman et al. (2014) explain, 
[Ethnographic] evidence suggests that PCC dominated the wholesale drug distribution of 
illegal drugs into the city of São Paulo during the second half of the 2000s. From this van-
tage position, it established exclusive deals with local retail distributors located at favelas, 
who later became PCC operatives. (4)
A look onto newspaper and news website archives shows that PCC has been 
active in Sapé and has been using its space as a stage for actions such as executions. In 
a report from February 2017, O Estado de S. Paulo news outlet informs audiences of the 
trial of one of the top commanders of PCC. He was being prosecuted for ordering two 
killings, which occurred in Sapé in 2004 (Hisayasu and Carvalho 2017). 
The entry of a third group of actors, the government—in this case represented 
by the police—was registered in Sapé after the parallel power took control of the set-
tlement. Police incursions, as the one previously narrated, took place on some occa-
sions. A 2017 report from Agora newspaper narrates the conduction of a police force 
“mega-operation” against drug trafficking in all parts of São Paulo City, especially 
including five favelas among which is Sapé (Fontes 2017).   
Aside from raids, the upgrading policy comes as another type of effort to regain 
spatial domain on the government’s end. Naturally, this is not the sole intention of 
these interventions. It should be mentioned that the reason stated by the São Paulo 
City Housing Department for the clearance of the creek’s shores, for instance, was 
the existence in this area of precarious houses, which were subject to floods (Formicki 
2016, 56). In fact, as already mentioned, many residences—some of which consisted of 
extremely precarious materials such as wood—were in the flood-risk area. However, 
the fact that some clearances created a more encompassing visibility in Sapé and 
thereby enabled the circulation of eventual police raids should not be disregarded.
Sapé, like most Brazilian favelas, was abundant in narrow alleys, dead ends, and 
tiny circulation spaces. As a result of the creek’s floodplain clearing, a vast open space 
was created. This space enabled a better view of the favela’s central area and also made 
circulation easier.
Figures 1 and 2 depict spatial differences in Sapé before and after the upgrading 
works. The first image is from 2005, when the settlement had more housing density 
and shacks covered up the stream course. It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify 
any street or alley. Figure 2 shows the physical situation of Favela do Sapé in 2017. By 
this time, the upgrading interventions were over and many residences had been cleared 
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Figure 1 Favela do Sapé, 2005 (Image from Google Earth and adapted by the author)
Figure 2 Favela do Sapé, 2017 (Image from Google Earth and adapted by the author)
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alongside the waterfront. It is possible to see one street built on both sides of the chan-
neled creek. 
Figure 3 zooms into one of the former images. One can see an intermediate stage 
between 2005 and 2017 during which the works were still underway. The future street 
and a newly-established visual horizon that overlooks the upstream portion of the 
favela are already visible.  
According to Samper (2012), upgrading could be a means to reduce violence in 
informal urban settlements (59). Moreover, the author asserts that governments inter-
fere with the urban environment to increase real and perceived levels of security (62). 
Samper sees “a trend in Latin America towards multi practice (urban upgrading) 
design as tools for the state agencies to re-conquer spaces where the right of the state 
to control the means of repression . . . is in frontal contestation” (64-65). In this sense, 
governments are directly disputing spatial control with the parallel powers via upgrad-
ing practices.
Figure 3 Clearance of the stream’s margins in Favela do Sapé during the upgrading 
works. The stream runs between the green guardrails. (Photo by the author)
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This logic is corroborated by Sapé’s upgrading designer. As she states in an inter-
view carried out by this article’s author, altering the “constancy of places” implies revis-
iting strategies of territorial occupation, especially on the local parallel power’s end.
It should also be mentioned that local governments across Brazil usually do not 
justify upgrading interventions on violence control grounds. Authorities do not claim 
that these improvement plans are important because they curb the control the parallel 
power has over favelas. This fact is implicit. However, different administrations tend 
to broadly announce and advertise actions exclusively dedicated to fighting off drug 
dealing influences on these communities. This happened in the late 2000s when the 
UPPs (Pacification Police Units) were implemented in the City of Rio de Janeiro by the 
Rio de Janeiro state government, and in 2018 when the Brazilian military was allowed 
to intervene in the city to carry out armed raids against local criminal gangs. 
At the crucial moment of upgrading, another group of social actors comes into 
play. This group represents the possessors of technical knowledge, which may relate to 
the fields of urban planning, architecture, urban design, civil engineering, social pol-
icy, etc. Members of this party were trained and educated with the purpose of imple-
menting physical and social changes. In Sapé’s case, these changes should affect not 
only its dwellers, but also inhabitants of the surroundings, as said one member of the 
upgrading design team states, 
[Sapé’s upgrading] resulted in an urban gain, resulted in a gain for that place, for beyond 
the favela, which I think is a duty of public money. All that is public money. So, it is not 
possible that all that will be destined for those who live in Sapé. This is another rationale 
that I believe has always been important to us. Which is to say that it should generate 
something good for the city. Regardless of the favela. Because, otherwise, we will be pri-
vatizing the use of public money.
In the quest for power in Sapé, technical professionals usually side with the gov-
ernment and deploy their knowledge in corroboration with favela-upgrading practices. 
One member of the upgrading design team mentioned in an interview with the author 
that during the upgrading process, the team always partnered with the city govern-
ment and dialogued with public officials. 
5. Conselho Gestor: A Governmental Approach
Another city mechanism that perpetuates efforts to exercise more power during 
upgrading works is the Conselho Gestor, or Management Council. This is a type of local 
council which is made up of dwellers and landowners of an area to be upgraded, as 
well as public officials and NGOs that work inside or with the area. This council is 
informative and also deliberates on the outcomes of the proposed upgrading program 
(Formicki 2016, 27).
The Management Council is set up by City Hall officials and comprises regular 
meetings that take place not in the City Hall premises, but in the area that is about to be 
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upgraded. During these meetings, information on project deadlines is presented. Also, 
the project itself is presented along with maps, plans, and drawings. Citizens are then 
consulted about architectural details to be implemented. This council is an attempt 
to approach favela dwellers as authorities. By establishing a means of dialogue with 
favela dwellers and by granting them some decision-making power over their future, 
this approach can be seen as a way of mollifying eventual demands and complaints 
about the lack of room for community participation. The constitution of participatory 
planning mechanisms such as the Management Council also underscores a previous 
level of organization and engagement with favela dwellers—and, broadly speaking, 
peripheral urbanites. As Caldeira (2016) argues, these citizens from the Global South 
come together in networks that secure jobs, local support, and rights such as tenure 
regularization (10). The author explains that “the quality of the urban environment has 
significantly improved and residents of the peripheries have been able to remain in 
the neighborhoods they built, in large measure due to their constant organizing” (15). 
The Council initiative has generated positive effects, which can be noticed in 
quotations from both São Paulo authorities and from Sapé locals. In an interview with 
the author, an official from the Housing Department asserted that the “Management 
Council was also a great learning opportunity. Establishing the Management Council 
[in Sapé], discussing with them, understanding the dynamics of the population. That 
was a great learning opportunity.” A community dweller also had a good impression 
of the approach: “The best thing that existed was inventing this council thing. To help 
the community.” 
The way Sapé dwellers view management councils is not, however, unanimously 
positive. As one local dweller and member of the council puts,
Because under this mayor here, this administration here, he gives a lot of opportunity to 
the councils. The councilmen have free pass inside the Housing [Department]. Councils 
there have free will. There the councilmen can call and arrange a meeting. You can see 
that, when it is in somebody’s schedule, it is set up. They have it there. But there is a prob-
lem. They schedule, we talk, but they don’t keep [to their promises].
Two elements can be witnessed in this testimony. First, there is an institutional 
arrangement within São Paulo City’s governance structure that allows management 
councils to have great outreach. Councilmen are not ignored nor put on hold. However, 
a second element stands out: According to this Sapé councilwoman, agreements are 
not fulfilled on the authorities’ end.
One question should then be posed: what is the point of the Management Council? 
As the two elements previously brought up indicate, the point of this institutional 
arrangement is basically twofold: giving favela dwellers a sense of power and influ-
ence over the upgrading outcome of their settlement and, more importantly, by this 
means getting them to side with and support city officials in the bigger quest to alter 
the power balance in the community to favor the local government. Naturally, there 
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is not only a sense of granted power to dwellers; there is an actual concession from 
designers and public authorities. Nevertheless, this concession is somewhat limited, 
for the economic resources and the technical expertise belong to those government 
representatives and designers.
To end this section, two observations are made. Firstly, the exposed conclusions 
relate to one specific favela in São Paulo. Further studies might confirm if these con-
clusions can or cannot be replicated across other settlements, given that there are 
similar criminal structures that operate throughout not only the city but the entire 
state. Additionally, although the upgrading programs that were implemented had 
design specificities, they followed similar major rationales, such as the criteria for the 
selection of intervention areas.8 The way of conducting the upgrading plans—which 
includes the adoption of management councils—was also adopted similarly in many 
favelas. Thus, in a sense, Sapé may illustrate the conjuncture of many other favelas in 
São Paulo City and State.
The second observation is about the time frame of the described upgrading poli-
cies. They refer to three consecutive administrations, which ruled São Paulo between 
2004 and 2016. The current government has slowed the pace of upgrading works across 
the municipality and may change key components of the city’s housing policy.
6. Interpreting Sapé’s Upgrading through the Power Planning Approach
As this article approaches its end, a few more questions remain to be answered. They 
relate to the quest for power in favela-upgrading practices: How does the upgrading 
project of Favela do Sapé engender power imbalances? What is a power imbalance?
Let us start with the definition of power. Based on his power planning research, 
Bent Flyvbjerg (2002) asserts that “power defines physical, economic, social, and envi-
ronmental reality itself” (361). In Sapé’s upgrading case, power emanates from all social 
actors and realities. The government has economic might—for it finances the works—
as well as repressive police power. Caldeira (2016) argues that “while residents are the 
main agents of the production of space, the state is present in numerous ways: it reg-
ulates, legislates, writes plans, provides infrastructure, polices, and upgrades spaces” 
(7). The government also indirectly guides designers and other technicians, such as the 
Housing Department architects and planners. Teresa Caldeira explains, 
In the process [of developing peripheral land], state planners and agencies acted routinely 
after the fact in a way that benefitted private developers, improved neighborhoods, and 
consolidated the rights of residents. We can recognize the same logic in programs of land 
regularization and slum upgrading. (8) 
8 In a few words, one of the main elements that drove the selection of certain favelas over other areas is 
the location of settlements along hydrographic basins, as well as the physical precariousness and social 
vulnerability of some settlements.
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Sapé’s residents have popular power, which is conveyed through the election 
of their Management Council representatives and, more broadly, of city legislators. 
However, these residents have little if any economic and technical might. Lastly, the 
parallel power, through violence and fear, attempts to interfere with the favela’s power 
relationships.
A power imbalance may occur if one group of social actors is subdued and ends up 
underrepresented. As stated previously in this article, upgrading works are an overall 
attempt by governments to alter the amount of influence the parallel power holds. But 
the effects of upgrading practices happen distortedly, as the most affected group—the 
one that is actually mostly weakened in terms of power—is favela dwellers. Although 
physical interventions may disturb the routine of criminal organizations, residents end 
up facing the biggest power asymmetry.
For instance, in the case of São Paulo’s Management Council, the City Hall 
empowers this council as a pretext to the perpetration of changes that appeal mostly 
to the government. The council is not as autonomous as it seems, for it inconspicu-
ously incentivizes Sapé’s dwellers to feel included in the upgrading process and thus 
to support it. In this case, it is the political power emerging from the government that 
defines the institution of the Management Council as an informative and delibera-
tive mechanism; not the informative and deliberative attributes of the council itself. 
Analogously, Flyvbjerg argues that power may define the application of knowledge 
instead of letting knowledge reign for its own significance.
It is important to state that the parallel power in São Paulo is structured through 
a strong network that outsizes city and state boundaries. The primary organization 
behind the criminal world is the aforementioned PCC, which earns money from traf-
ficking in countless places and from other economic activities, too. Thus, the physical 
upgrading of PCC’s territories may not disturb this illegal group too much. On the 
other hand, favela residents end up in between a power dispute in which local author-
ities, with the support of technicians, try to expand its domain.
In this expansion attempt, the São Paulo government has changed its interven-
tion tactics throughout time. Historically, the city administration shifted from clearing 
favelas to upgrading them, as explained by one resident of Sapé: “Then, since I arrived 
here, I always listened to this upgrading plan. [But] they didn’t say ‘upgrading.’ They 
used to say ‘favela clearance.’” This change in the government’s discourse and actions 
showed that maybe authorities realized that favelas could not be fully reclaimed by 
clearance. Following this rationale, a smooth and incremental intervention could 
prove more successful. 
Research, such as Flyvbjerg’s, points to the sometimes overlooked relationship 
between power and rationality within planning practices. Rationality could be viewed 
as the technique- and expertise-based side of planning. According to the author, this 
side is oftentimes interpreted and manipulated by the group of social actors that con-
trols the planning mechanism. Thus, what matters the most is not the “correct, ratio-
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nal or true” interpretation, but actually “which party can put the greatest power behind 
its interpretation” (Flyvbjerg 2002, 36).
In the upgrading of Sapé, what prevailed was the interpretation of the city gov-
ernment, which shaped the rational approach of designers and technicians. And there 
were strong reasons for the local authorities to lead their take on rationality: the social 
vulnerability and physical precariousness of the settlement’s dwellers and, last but not 
least, the intention to weaken the influence of the parallel power over local residents.
The outcomes of this interpretation are as follows:
a) The physical transformation of Favela do Sapé, which, among other things, created 
new horizon lines and facilitated circulation in the settlement;
b) An increase in the presence of the local government; and,
c) The forging of an allegiance with local residents through the Management Council.
The transformation of Sapé’s spaces resulted in a change in the way these spaces 
were appropriated by local residents and by the parallel power. Although this transfor-
mation is permanent, it may not lastingly affect the power dynamics in this favela if the 
government does not permanently operate there.
This leads us to the second outcome. During the upgrading works, government 
officials were constantly seen in Sapé. By “government officials” I mean architects, 
planners, social workers, and engineers. The police eventually made incursions, as 
described in this paper’s introduction.
Nevertheless, after the end of the works most of these officials were relocated to 
other areas or went back to their offices. There is no São Paulo City urban policy that 
effectively brings a government presence to favelas on a permanent basis. Although 
the upgrading brought important public infrastructure and services, such as sewage 
collection, many other elements are still missing. Public facilities such as daycares 
and libraries, which denote the amicable and necessary presence of the state, were not 
implemented. It is important to say that police patrolling is also important—not only 
in favelas, but the entire city—but should not be the sole means of state action.
The last outcome was also established through a temporary logic. The 
Management Council brought many Sapé residents closer to government authorities 
and, therefore, empowered the City Hall and, to some extent, local dwellers. However, 
after the completion of the works the Management Council of Sapé, although not dis-
solved,9 became considerably less active.10 This shows that, once again, the upgrading 
efforts carried out in Favela do Sapé led to an ephemeral increase in government pres-
ence. Therefore, although significant, the government-sponsored change in the power 
9 The Council still formally exists because its period of validity has not yet expired. Also, as there were a 
few condominiums which were still left to be built, and a new bidding process for their construction might 
approach, this structure has not been dismantled.
10 One source from the Housing Department explained that, in practical terms, only one council person 
has still been working on behalf of the Management Council.
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dynamics caused by and witnessed during Favela do Sapé’s upgrading did not fully 
accomplish the desire of the City Hall’s authorities. 
7. Concluding Remarks
Caldeira (2016) argues that “peripheries are, undoubtedly, about inequality” (9). Based 
on the power planning framework, I argue that this inequality is mirrored by power 
imbalances in favelas across São Paulo.
Government authorities, criminal organizations, planners, designers, and resi-
dents are unequally involved in the quest for control over favelas. The recent upgrading 
attempts in São Paulo convey the way this quest is currently shaped. It is a powerful 
mechanism in a sense that it aims at securing the incorporation of favelas into the 
jurisdiction of the state. After all, upgrading means disturbing the presence of the 
dominant parallel power. It also implies an attempt to establish legal participatory 
institutions, such as the Management Council, that can bring favela dwellers into the 
urban realm and also persuade them to side with the local government.
If residents tend to be highly and disproportionately affected by state interven-
tions, criminal gangs may not be equally hit. This does not necessarily mean that 
favela-upgrading practices are deceitful or harmful. Upgrading should not be viewed 
through a good-or-bad lens. It should be seen as a mechanism of incorporation of mar-
ginalized urban dwellers by the state, which results in power struggles and imbalances. 
Its effects could be positive or negative depending on which social actor is regarded 
and, especially, each actor’s strength.
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